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TURECAMO v. COMMISSIONER: TREATMENT OF
BENEFITS RECEIVED UNDER THE MEDICARE
PROGRAM FOR PURPOSES OF THE
DEPENDENCY EXEMPTION
SUPPORT TEST
In order to claim another individual as a dependent on his
federal income tax return for a particular year, a taxpayer is re-
quired to provide over one-half of that individual's support during
the year.1  The Internal Revenue Code 2 and the Treasury Regu-
lations,3 however, provide little guidance as to what items should
be included in the term "support." Although the section of the
Code defining gross income 4 is of some assistance, several items
that are normally excluded in a gross income calculation must be
included in the support determination.5 Thus, the application of
the one-half support test in certain situations may be more difficult
than one would expect.
Benefits received under the various federal social welfare pro-
grams raise questions regarding what constitutes an individual's sup-
port. For purposes of the one-half support test, benefits can either
be included in the total support computation or disregarded. 6 The
treatment of benefits received under federal Old Age Survivors and
Disability Insurance,7 Aid to Families with Dependent Children,8
private health insurance, and other benefit programs for purposes
of the computation of support has been determined in court deci-
sions and revenue rulings. Nevertheless, these decisions have failed
I IR.C. § 152(a).
2All references to the "Code" are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended.
3 Treasury Regulations are authoritative pronouncements providing official inter-
pretations and explanations of Code sections.
4 I.R.C. § 61.
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2)(ii):
In computing the amount which is contributed for the support of the indi-
vidual, there must be included any amount which is contributed by such
individual for his own support, including income which is ordinarily ex-
cludable from gross income, such as benefits received under the Social
Security Act ....
6 See [1977] 1 ST. FED. TAx REp. (CCH) f 1242.048.
7Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-29 (1970), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-31 (Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as OASDI].
8 The federal guidelines for the various state AFDC programs may be found
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-60 (Supp. V 1975).
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to explain adequately why some benefits are treated as support
while others are completely disregarded.
In Turecamo v. Commissioner,9 the Second Circuit affirmed a
Tax Court decision' 0 holding that benefits received under Part A
of the Medicare program 1 should be disregarded in applying the
one-half support test in the same way that benefits are disregarded
when they are received under Part B 12 of the Medicare program
and private health insurance plans. 13 Although this issue was one
of first impression, the decision overruled a prior ruling by the
Commissioner that, because Part A Medicare benefits were com-
parable to benefits provided by OASDI, they should be included in
a computation of total support for the individual and should also
be treated as support furnished by the individual receiving the
benefits. 14  This decision additionally rejected the Commissioner's
contention that Part A benefits are sufficiently distinguishable from
Part B benefits to justify different treatment in a computation of
support. The Second Circuit reached its conclusion by relying on
a two-part analysis based on both statutory and practical considera-
tions. The statutory ground is basically concerned with refuting
the Commissioner's argument by illustrating that his reasons for
including Part A benefits are based on distinctions from Part B
benefits that are irrelevant to the support determination. The sec-
ond ground for holding that the benefits should be disregarded
concentrates on the similarity of Part A Medicare to private health
insurance and the effect on the economic relationship between tax-
payers and the claimed dependent resulting from the payment of
such benefits.
9 554 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1977).
'0 Turecamo v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 720 (1975).
11 Medicare is the common name for Subchapter XVIII of the Social Security
Act, currently codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-139511 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
H 1395-1395pp (Supp. V 1975). Part A is one of the three sections of the Medi-
care statute and is entitled "Hospital Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled"
[hereinafter cited as Part A] and is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395i-2 (1970),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395i-2 (Supp. V 1975).
12 Part B, entitled "Supplementary Medical Insurance Benefits for Aged and
Disabled" [hereinafter cited as Part B, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395w
(1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1395i-1395w (Supp. V 1975). The Commissioner
has ruled previously that Part B benefits are excludable from a recipients support
because they are "in the nature of medical insurance proceeds." Rev. Rul. 70-341,
1970-2 C.B. 31, at 32.
13The Commissioner has determined that the cost of premiums to obtain pri-
vate health insurance, and not the medical expenses paid for by the policy, is to be
included in the support determination and attributed to the individual. Rev. Rul.
64-223, 1964-2 C.B. 50. Accord, Mawhinney v. Comm'r, 355 F.2d 462 (3d Cir.
1966), aff'g per curiam, 43 T.C. 443 (1965).
14 Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31.
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This Comment will examine the Second Circuit's "two sepa-
rate analytical grounds" 11 for its decision, demonstrating that the
court's practical effect analysis provides a superior basis for exclud-
ing Part A benefits from the computation of support. This Com-
ment will also focus on the qualities of the various government
benefits programs and the policy considerations underlying the
Second Circuit's practical effect analysis, illustrating that the court's
reasoning can be simplified into a two-part test that may be applied
to several government benefit programs. The Comment will then
apply this test to substantiate the results of prior decisions concern-
ing whether certain benefits should be included in total support
and to predict the results for program benefits that have yet to be
encountered in the support test context. Finally, this Comment
will examine the major National Health Insurance proposals before
the 95th Congress to demonstrate that the application of this test
to any of these programs would lead to an acceptable resolution of
the issue whether program benefits should be included in the com-
putation of support.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Relevant Statutory Provisions
Analysis of the interrelation of the Social Security Act and the
Internal Revenue Code requires a basic understanding of the rele-
vant statutory provisions. Subchapter XVIII of the Social Security
Act contains the program commonly referred to as Medicare.16 This
government-sponsored health insurance program for the elderly 17
is composed of three interrelated parts. Part A is a basic plan
financed by a separate compulsory payroll tax that provides protec-
tion against the costs of hospitalization and related care.18 All
those who qualify for OASDI payments or benefits under the Rail-
road Retirement Act 19 automatically qualify for Part A Medicare
benefits.20 All other persons over 65 can now receive Part A bene-
fits by payment of monthly premiums provided that they also enroll
in Part B.
21
15 554 F.2d at 568.
16 Medicare was originally enacted in 1965. Social Security Amendments of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, Title I, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 291 (1965).
17 See 554 F.2d at 571 & n.8.
1842 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp. V 1975). See note 11 supra.
19 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231t (Supp. V 1975).
2042 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp. V 1975).
2142 U.S.C. § 1395i-2 (Supp. V 1975).
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Part B is a voluntary insurance program available to persons
aged 65 and older 22 that supplements Part A with coverage for phy-
sicians' services as well as other medical and health services not
covered under Part A.23 This portion of Medicare is financed by a
combination of voluntary premium payments made by those cov-
ered under the program and matching contributions by the govern-
ment from the general revenues.24  Although enrollment is
voluntary under Part B, "the economic pressure on individuals
eligible for Part B benefits to enroll in the supplemental program
amounts to practical compulsion to do so. Because the Govern-
ment underwrites half of the participant's costs of Part B, commer-
cial plans providing benefits equivalent to Part B are unavailable
at competitive premium costs." 25 Furthermore, the statute is now
written so that individuals who attain the age of 65 and who qualify
for Part A coverage will automatically be enrolled in the Part B
program 26 unless they take positive steps to terminate coverage. 27
Thus, in a practical sense, the differences between Parts A and B
often become blurred.
The definitions for terms used in both Part A and B are set
forth in the third part of the Medicare statute, Part C.28 In addi-
tion, Part C sets forth those medical expenses that must be ex-
cluded from coverage under both Parts A and B 29 and establishes
the same eligibility appeals procedure for both parts.30
The Internal Revenue Code contains two relevant sections
that set forth the personal exemption qualifications with regard to
dependents. Section 151 of the Code grants a taxpayer a $750
personal exemption for each qualified dependent that he claims on
his tax return.31 Section 152 of the Code specifies nine classes of
2242 U.S.C. § 1395o (Supp. V 1975).
23 See note 12 supra.
24554 F.2d at 572; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395r, 1395w (Supp. V 1975).
25 554 F.2d at 574 (footnote omitted); see H.R. REP. No. 92-231, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4989, 5054-55.
2642 U.S.C. § 1395p(f) (Supp. V 1975). The premium will then be deducted
each month from the OASDI benefit check. 42 U.S.C. § 1395s (Supp. V 1975).
2
7 An individual who is automatically enrolled and does not want to be covered
under the program must file a notice to that effect in order to terminate this
coverage and thereby discontinue deduction of the premium payments from his
OASDI benefit check. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395q(b) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
2S 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x-139511 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13 95 x-1395pp
(Supp. V 1975).
2942 U.S.C. § 1395y (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y (Supp. V 1975).
3042 U.S.C. § 1395ff (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (Supp. V 1975).
31 I.R.C. § 151(e) (Supp. V 1975).
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persons who are eligible to qualify as dependents. 32 In order to be
able to claim an eligible individual as a dependent, the taxpayer
must provide over one-half of the support of the individual claimed
"for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer
begins .... , 33 Support includes food, shelter, clothing, medical
and dental care, education, and the like.34 The dependency sup-
port test involves two steps. The first step is a calculation of the
total support provided for the individual, and the second step is to
determine whether the amount contributed by the claimant con-
stitutes over one-half of this total support cost.
35
In dealing with the benefits from various government pro-
grams and the determination of what constitutes support and to
whom it is to be attributed, the courts and the Commissioner have
been far from consistent, declining to follow any general rule.3 6
Prior decisions often rely on a Treasury Regulation promulgated
in 1957 using "benefits received under the Social Security Act" as
a general example of types of income that are excludable from
gross income but includable in a support calculation without pro-
viding an adequate analytical framework to guide subsequent deci-
sions with regard to treatment of other government benefits. 37 For
32 I.R.C. § 152(a).
33 Id. Furthermore, unless the individual is a child of the taxpayer who is
either under 19 years of age or a student, the gross income of the individual "for
the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins" must be less
than $750. I.R.C. § 151(e)(1).
34 Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a) (2) (i). In order to be counted as support for
purposes of determining qualification for exemption, the payment or assistance must
actually be used by the claimed dependent. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-468, 1971-2
C.B. 115; Rev. Rul. 58-419, 1958-2 C.B. 57; Rev. Rul. 57-344, 1957-2 C.B. 112,
modified by Rev. Rul. 64-222, 1964-2 C.B. 47.
35 See 554 F.2d at 569; Hogg v. United States, 428 F.2d 274, 283 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1970); Ilofta v. United States, 333 F. Supp.
781 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Hopkins v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 538, 541 (1970).
36 Kxawchick, Who is a Dependent? Whose Dependent? What is Support?,
29 N.Y.U. INSr. o- FED. TAx. 1343, 1354 (1971).
37 See note 5 supra. This provision alone is clearly insufficient authority to
determine the treatment of the various benefits provided by the Social Security Act.
In the first place, if this regulation were strictly interpreted it would provide an
easy answer to the question posed in Turecamo. Medicare is a title of the Social
Security Act; therefore Medicare benefits are "received under the Social Security
Act" and thus includable as support. The problem is not so simple, however.
When this regulation was adopted in 1957, Medicare did not exist; the regulation
arguably refers only to Social Security Act benefits that were in existence as of the
year 1957. On the other hand, the regulation arguably does apply to Medicare
because no relevant amendment was made to the regulation after Medicare was
established in 1965. But administrative inaction should not always be interpreted
as an approval of all the possible new ramifications of a prior ruling. More im-
portantly, the Commissioner has already ruled in Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31,
that Part B Medicare benefits, classified as benefits paid under the Social Security
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example, benefits received under the OASDI program and used
for the support of the recipient have been required to be counted
in the total support computation and treated as having been sup-
plied by the beneficiary for his own support.38 Similarly, benefits
paid to an indigent parent under the AFDC program have been
held to be support furnished by the state and thus includable in
the support calculation for purposes of the dependency exemption
support test.39 Furthermore, similar cash benefits that the recipient
may freely spend have also been found to be includable in total
support to the extent they are used for items commonly considered
support.40 No consistent rationale has been advanced for these
determinations, however, forcing the Turecamo court to develop
its own approach to the issue of first impression.
B. The Factual Setting of Turecamo
In 1970, 81 year old Mrs. Kavanaugh resided with the Ture-
camos, her son-in-law and daughter.41 Mrs. Kavanaugh, whose only
source of income was money she received as social security benefits,
42
spent two months in the hospital where she incurred substantial
medical expense.43 Part A Medicare paid for over ninety-percent of
the total hospital bills." The Turecamos paid for the balance of
Act, are to be disregarded in a support computation despite the language of Treas.
Reg. 1.152-1(a) (2)(ii) (1957) (superseded). The problem in Turecamo must be
approached from another perspective.
38 Black v. Comm'r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 616 (1972); Rev. Rul. 74-543, 1974-2
C.B. 39; Rev. Rul. 58-419, 1958-2 C.B. 57; Rev. Rul. 57-344, 1957-2 C.B. 112.
Many court decisions appear to assume that only receipt of the benefits is
sufficient for inclusion in the support computation. E.g., Kincheloe v. Comm'r, 30
T.C.M. (CCH) 154 (1971). In these decisions, however, the only issue before
the court is whether to include an item in support. Under such circumstances, the
courts do not differentiate between "receipt" and "receipt and use," the latter being
the appropriate test.
39 See, e.g., Lutter v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 685 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 514 F.2d
1095 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975); Leggett v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M.
(CCH) 21 (1976). The cases and rulings assume that AFDC benefits are included
in a total support computation and not disregarded without giving reasons for this
treatment. These decisions are primarily concerned with a determination of to
whom the benefits are attributable; the parent, the child or the state.
40 See, e.g., Carter v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 109 (1970) (state old-age assistance);
Rev. Rul. 74-153, 1974-1 C.B. 20 (state payments to adoptive parents); Rev. Rul.
71-468, 1971-2 C.B. 115 (Commissioner's acquiescence to the Carter result).
41 554 F.2d at 566. Mrs. Kavanaugh, as the mother-in-law of Mr. Turecamo
and the mother of Mrs. Turecamo, qualified as a member of two classes of persons
eligible for dependency status. See I.R.C. §§ 152(a) (4) & (8).
42 64 T.C. at 721. These benefits totaled $1,140. 554 F.2d at 567.
43554 F.2d at 566.




these bills and the cost of home nursing care, and they provided
Mrs. Kavanaugh with food, clothing, lodging, and entertainment.4 5
The Turecamos, assuming that the hospital bills paid by Part A
Medicare were properly disregarded in Mrs. Kavanaugh's support
calculation, determined that they had furnished over one-half of her
support in 1970. They consequently claimed Mrs. Kavanaugh as a
dependent on their joint federal income tax return and also in-
cluded the amount they had spent for her medical care as deduct-
ible medical expenses.
40
These deductions were disallowed by the Commissioner. He
ruled that because the Part A Medicare payments must be considered
as support attributable to Mrs. Kavanaugh, the taxpayers had failed
to provide one-half of her support.47 The Commissioner based his
ruling on the dichotomy between social welfare on one hand and
individual medical insurance on the other. He determined that
although benefits in the nature of medical insurance proceeds are
to be disregarded, those benefits paid for the purpose of furthering
social welfare objectives are to be included in the total support and
attributed to the recipient.48 The Commissioner then character-
ized Part A benefits as "social insurance or welfare benefits" and
thus includable in the total support computation and attributable to
the individual.49 He distinguished Part B benefits by character-
izing them as "individual insurance proceeds"; 50 this characteriza-
tion enabled the Commissioner to reconcile this ruling with his
prior determination that Part B benefits were excludable from the
total support computation.51 This distinction between Part A and
Part B benefits rested on the "compulsory" nature of participation
in Part A and the "voluntary" nature of participation in Part B.
52
The Tax Court rejected this distinction and reversed the deter-
mination of the Commissioner, however, holding that benefits re-
ceived under Part A of the Medicare program should also be dis-
regarded for purposes of the dependency exemption support test.
4
GThe Turecamos estimated that they had furnished Mrs. Kavanaugh with
$7,531.00 support, including $3,531 in medical expenses and $4,000 in food, lodging,
and entertainment. See id. 566-67.
46 Id. 567.
47 Id. 567-68.
48 Id. 569-70; see notes 12-13, 38-39 supra & accompanying text.
49 See 554 F.2d at 571.
60 See id.
51 See note 12 supra.
.2 554 F.2d at 572.
55 64 T.C. at 728-29.
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II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT OPINION IN Turecamo
The Second Circuit initially approached this issue of first im-
pression by examining the mechanism and underlying considerations
of the dependency exemption support test. The application of this
test involves two distinct determinations: (1) whether an item
should be included in the computation of total support; and, if
so, (2) to whom is that item of support attributable.54 In dealing
with these questions of inclusion and attribution, the court con-
sidered the legislative history of the dependency exemption support
test in order to ascertain the congressional intent.55  The court
concluded that the key to determining dependency was not the
inability to support oneself but rather the "economic relationship
maintained between the claimed dependent and the claiming tax-
payer." 56 After studying the support test, the court proceeded
with a two-part analysis focusing on statutory and practical
considerations.
A. Statutory Analysis
The crux of the court's statutory analysis is a response to the
Commissioner's theory that Part A and Part B were sufficiently dis-
tinct to warrant different treatment in the support determination.
The court concedes that congressional debates and pertinent com-
mentary indicate "a generally accepted characterization of Part A
as a compulsory social insurance or welfare plan and of Part B as a
voluntary individual insurance plan." 57 The court concluded, how-
ever, that these categorizations of Parts A and B were inconclusive
for support test purposes, recognizing that Part A was labeled
"social welfare" and Part B was labeled "individual insurance"
mainly because of their "respective provisions for compulsory and
voluntary financing." 58 The court then examined the legislative
history to ascertain those policy considerations that ostensibly
motivated these different funding methods.59 These concerns in-
54 See 554 F.2d at 569.
55Id. 568-69 n.6. The court referred to the legislative history of §25(b)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. This section was the predecessor of § 152(a)
of the 1954 Code; the 1954 Code did not intend to make any real changes in the
definition of dependent. See H.R. R~a,. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4043, 4178.
56 554 F.2d at 568 n.6, citing, e.g., S. REP. No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1944] U.S. CoNG. SERv. 1056, 1061.





cluded: the desire to guarantee that eligible citizens would parti-
cipate; 60 the desire to maintain the participants' dignity and self-
respect; "1 the maintenance of the fiscal integrity of the Social
Security system; 62 a recognition that hospital costs are easier to
predict actuarially than are physicians' costs; 03 doubts about the
costs, burdens, and fairness of compulsory financing; 64 and appre-
hension about the possible intrusive effect upon physician-patient
1
60111 CONG. REC. 7239 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Ullman). The general
feeling was that the high cost of medical insurance for the elderly prevented many
of the elderly who, as a class, were generally impoverished, from acquiring medical
insurance coverage. Even if the entire Medicare program was funded in a manner
similar to Part B, with one-half covered by participants' premium payments and
one-half from general revenues, the high cost of hospital coverage would still
operate to maintain a level of premium payments that would be beyond the means
of many of the elderly. By funding hospital costs totally through a payroll tax,
individuals were in effect able to pay for their hospital coverage for those years
past 65 years of age while they were still employed. See, e.g., 111 CoNG. EEc.
7214 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Mills).
61id. 7229 (remarks of Rep. King); 7354-55 (remarks of Rep. Farbstein);
15824 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff). The rationale fails to support the two-tier
funding of Medicare. Taxpayer contributions to both Part A (through taxes) and
Part B (through premium payments) foster self-respect because there is no stig-
matization characteristic of programs paying benefits on the basis of need. Thus,
although this rationale explains why the Medicare program was established without
a need requirement, it fails to justify the different funding methods of Parts A and B.
62Id. 7221-27 (remarks of Rep. Mills and Rep. Byrnes); 7244 (remarks of
Rep. Secrest); 7363 (remarks of Rep. Edwards); 7366 (remarks of Rep. Barrett);
7403-04 (remarks of Rep. Broyhill). It was believed that putting the entire burden
on a payroll tax would necessitate a tax that was regarded as too high. Conversely,
Congress felt that putting the entire burden on the general fund of the Treasury
would run the risk of bankrupting the Federal Treasury. Although the latter argu-
ment may be exaggerated, it highlights the realistic inability of the Treasury's
general fund to support entirely the cost of adequate medical care for our elderly.
See, e.g., id. 7213 (remarks of Rep. Mills).
63 Id. 7238 (remarks of Rep. Ullman). Although actuarial projections may be
easier for hospital costs over the long run, such predictions are not needed because
the money collected under Part A is not intended to be used for the contributor
in the distant future but is rather used presently for those individuals who are
currently over 65 and eligible under the program. Under both Parts A and B,
actuarial projections need only extend a few years into the future.
64 Id. 7221-22 (remarks of Rep. Byrnes); 7233-34 (remarks of Rep. Schneebeli);
7240-41 (remarks of Rep. Betts); 7358-59 (remarks of Rep. Fuqua); 7365-66
(remarks of Rep. Barrett); 7367-68 (remarks of Rep. Clancy); 7393-94 (remarks
of Rep. Hall); 15869-72 (remarks of Sen. Curtis). The establishment of Part A
as a voluntary full premium program would create the possibility that only the bad
risks would participate in the program, thereby making actuarial calculations more
difficult, requiring premiums to be increased substantially or supplemented by
general tax revenue, and eventually leading to a financial collapse of the program.
Furthermore, it was felt that all medical costs could not be financed by a com-
pulsory payroll tax because the tax would be too high. Therefore, because hospital
care was found to be the single largest portion of medical care, the program was
devised so that an individual could make advance payments for the largest element
of health care before his income stream ceased upon retirement. Id. 7213-14
(remarks of Rep. Mills).
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relationships by a government-financed program.0 None of these
policy considerations, however, help to demonstrate that the com-
pulsory nature of the Part A program mandates that benefits re-
ceived be counted in the total support computation.
Although the foregoing legislative considerations may dis-
close a variety of reasons underlying the decision to fund
Part A largely by means of payroll taxes and to finance
Part B through voluntary premiums, they shed no light at
all on the intent of Congress as it relates to the dependency
support test consequences of benefits paid under Part A.66
The court continued its statutory analysis and compared Parts
A and B from the perspective of "pragmatic realities" 11 of the fund-
ing procedures. The court further illustrated the inapplicability
of the Commissioner's compulsory/voluntary dichotomy in this con-
text by demonstrating that "participation is legally compulsory in
neither but practically compelled in each, and each program is de-
pendent at least in part on compulsory tax revenues." 68 Partici-
pation is virtually compelled under the Part B program because
similar insurance is unavailable at competitive rates.69 Further-
more, although an individual is not legally compelled to accept
Part A benefits, he is legally compelled to pay the taxes that support
the Part A program from his earnings. 70  Therefore, as a practical
65 Part B was financed under a voluntary scheme partly as a compromise
measure. The voluntary characteristic served to allay the apprehensions of physi-
cians who feared an excess of federal regulation over the physician-patient relation-
ship. See id. 7214 (remarks of Rep. Mills); 7392-93 (remarks of Rep. Hall).
For a brief discussion of the final legislative acts leading to the creation of Part B,
see J. MANLEy, TH Por ncs OF FNANcE, 118-121 (1970).
66 554 F.2d at 573. The court also was not persuaded by the observation
that payments made as premiums under Part B are deductible medical expenses
although the taxes paid to finance Part A are not similarly deductible. "'The fact
that Congress chose to allow a medical expense deduction . . . for the Part B
premium payments but not for the tax paid to finance Part A, has no bearing on
the nature of the benefits paid when the risk insured against occurs."' Id. 573 n.18
(quoting 64 T.C. at 728). For example, the discrepancy in treatment may have
occurred because of "the considerable administrative difficulties which would be
involved if the Part A hospital insurance tax were made deductible." Id. 576 n.26
(citing 64 T.C. at 738 n.21).
67 554 F.2d at 574.
68 Id.
69 Id.; see text accompanying note 25 supra.
70 See LR.C. §§3101(b), 3111(b), 1401(b). The court implicitly assumes
that "participation" in a program is restricted to receipt of benefits. One might
argue that "participation" should include either receipt of benefits or payment of
premiums. In that case, "participation" in Part A would be legally compelled.
Nevertheless, practical realities would still indicate that these programs are less
distinct than the Commissioner's compulsory/voluntary dichotomy assumes. That
distinction is a poor basis for support test determination.
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matter, he has no choice but to accept Part A benefits. Thus, the
funding methods for these programs provide only inconclusive dis-
tinctions between them; consequently, this dichotomy is an in-
appropriate criterion in the dependency support test context.
The court concludes its statutory analysis by examining certain
characteristics of the Part A program that are analogous to private
health insurance and distinguish it from welfare programs.71 Like
private health insurance, benefits under Part A of Medicare are
payable only if specific medical contingencies occur.72 The benefits
are paid to cover the cost of these contingencies; in fact, the ben-
eficiary never receives money under Part A because payment is
made directly to the provider hospitals. 73  Conversely, Part A is
distinguishable from social welfare type programs because benefits
under such programs as OASDI or AFDC are made unconditionally
available to the beneficiary in the form of cash benefits.74 Neverthe-
less, the court fails to justify using these characteristics in determin-
ing inclusion or exclusion of Part A benefits in the computation
of support. Unless the court explains why it disregards private
health insurance benefits but includes AFDC and OASDI benefits
in total support, a demonstration that Part A has more similarities
to private health insurance fails to resolve the underlying question.
Furthermore, the court failed to rebut the logical notion that re-
ceipt of aid in general should be conceived as support and therefore
attributable to the person whose payments enabled the beneficiary
to receive benefits.75 Thus, the court's statutory analysis does little
more than refute the Commissioner's arguments; it alone is insuffi-
cient to justify disregarding Part A benefits.
B. Practical Effect Analysis
The Second Circuit initially recognized that Part A Medicare
is a hybrid form of medical insurance because it contains elements
both similar to and unlike private individual insurance. 76 The
71554 F.2d at 575.
7242 U.S.C. § 1395d (1970).
7342 U.S.C. § 1395f (1970).
7442 U.S.C. §606(b) (1970) (AFDC); 42 U.S.C. §402 (1970) (OASDI).
7G See note 81 infra.
76554 F.2d at 575. The elements of Part A that are similar to private insur-
ance are: "regular and periodic payments for specified protection against risk of
loss due to specified contingencies; the spreading of the payments against that risk
over time and over a pool of participants; the actuarially calculated self-sufficiency
of the disbursing fund .... ." The elements of Part A that are unlike private
insurance are: "compulsory financing through specially earmarked taxes; the non-
deductibility of those payments; and Government sponsorship of the funding." Id.
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court then examined these characteristics in light of its prior deter-
mination that the economic relationship between the recipient of
benefits and the taxpayer is the key determinant of dependency
support.77 The court concluded that the most significant feature of
Part A benefits for dependency support test purposes "is the regular
payment by a participant for financial protection against risk of
loss" because it "bears most directly on the existing economic rela-
tionship between the recipient" and the taxpayer.
78
The court noted that with "any insurance system providing
protection against unexpected medical expenses, the cost of that
-protection to a participant is plainly measured by the payments
made to obtain it." 79 The court then assumed that a rational, well-
planned economic relationship would include payment for medical
insurance coverage for the dependent party.80 The court con-
cluded that
the economic relationship between an insurance beneficiary
and one who regularly contributes to his support . . . will
reasonably include the routine cost of maintaining medical
insurance coverage for the beneficiary as the budgeted
"support" cost for his medical expenses, regardless of,
whether, that cost .takes the form of private insurance
premiums, voluntary Part A premiums, or compulsory
Part A taxes.81
77 See note 56 supra'& accompanying text.
78554 F.2d at 575. "These payments consist of the premiums paid by the
policyholder in the case of private individual insurance, and the payroll taxes paid
under Part A in the case of Medicare coverage." Id.
791Id. "'The average man looks at his health costs as his insurance premiums
plus his unreimbursed payments for health care, which accords with the economic
realities."' Id. 576 (quoting 64 T.C. at 730 n.1 (Wilbur, J., concurring)).
80 554 F.2d at 576.
sl Id. One problem that the court does not address involves the practical
difficulties of computing support when an individual has pre-paid his Part A cover-
age by paying the compulsory Part A taxes while he is still working. An individual
who is over 65 and has either private insurance or voluntary Part A coverage can
easily calculate this portion of his support because he pays annual premiums after
he is 65 to maintain this coverage. On the other hand, an individual perceives
that he is being taxed while he is working in order to pre-pay his premiums over
a period of years and upon reaching age 65 will be covered for the rest of his life.
Thus, although this aspect of his support is clearly attributable to the individual,
it will require complex mathematical analysis to determine how much of these
pre-paid "premiums" should be allocable to the individual's yearly support calcula-
tion. One rough approximation of this figure might be the current premiums for
maintenance of voluntarily acquired Part A coverage. This figure might not be a
good approximation, however, because a voluntary participant pays for each year
of coverage, whereas a compulsory participant pays for coverage that is of variable
duration, depending upon how long he lives. Nevertheless, the court implicitly
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In light of this conclusion, the court rejected the contention
that proceeds from such an insurance plan should also be included
in the support computation. "Viewing'large third party payments
(made when the contingency insured against occurs) as support can
be viewed as distorting the economic realities." 82 The court noted
that after Mrs. Kavanaugh left the hospital, the Turecamos con-
tinued to provide the "bulk of her normal living costs" just as they
had prior to the realization of the medical contingency. 3 The
court concluded that it would be an illogical "distortion of eco-
nomic realities" to deny the Turecamos a dependency exemption
simply because Mrs. Kavanaugh received hospitalization benefits
when the basic economic relationship that existed prior to hos-
pitalization continued largely unchanged after hospitalization.8s
The court's analysis of practical considerations excludes Part A
benefits as support because the contingency giving rise to their
receipt cannot be anticipated by the reasonable taxpayer, and be-
cause the court refuses to allow a distortion of reality-namely the
denial of dependency status to the recipient-when all parties as-
sumed and acted pursuant to the obligation of the taxpayer to
provide the bulk of dependent's normal living costs. This portion
of the opinion provides a superior basis for excluding Part A ben-
efits from computation of support, but the analysis employed by
the court is so enmeshed in the facts and benefit programs unique
to this case that other courts dealing with analogous situations may
be precluded from relying on its rationale. Consequently, the
substantive core of the court's practical effect analysis should be
examined to generalize the idiosyncratic analysis into a simplified
test with general applicability to several governmental benefit
programs.
III. GENERALIZING TH Turecamo ANALYsis
A. Underlying Policy Considerations
Prior case law and revenue rulings dealing with the treatment
of government benefits in the dependency support computation pro-
found that the difficulties of allocating the individual's contribution to his support
by pre-payment of medical coverage costs does not justify looking to the proceeds
to calculate the program's "costs" for support purposes.
82 Id. (quoting 64 T.C. at 730 n.1 (Wilbur, J., concurring)).
83 554 F.2d at 576.
84 "The random and contingent receipt of insurance benefits . . . under Part A,
interrupts but does not alter the otherwise established economic relationship betveen
the beneficiary, Mrs. Kavanaugh, and the Turecamos, who regularly contributed to
her support." Id. (footnote omitted).
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vide little guidance for dealing with analogous future situationss
Three policy considerations should be determinative: (1) prevent-
ing the "bargain purchase" of dependency exemptions; (2) avoid-
ing the disruption of the taxpayer's legitimate expectations; and
(3) treating similar economic relationships in a consistent manner.
One reason for counting OASDI, AFDC, and other govern-
ment benefits that may be used as the recipient pleases 86 in the
total support calculation is to prevent the establishment of a loop-
hole that would allow taxpayers to make a "bargain purchase" of
a dependency exemption. For example, many elderly and dis-
abled rely on OASDI benefits as their primary means of support,8 7
just as many welfare families rely on AFDC benefits for their sub-
sistence.88 A ruling that such benefits are to be disregarded for
purposes of the dependency support test would have the unde-
sirable effect of enabling a taxpaying relative of such people to
qualify for a $750 deduction by providing as little as one dollar
toward their support.89 This situation contrasts with private medi-
cal insurance and Medicare benefits, where despite the receipt of
benefits, the recipient must still be provided with other essentials.
Therefore, the amount that must be expended by a taxpayer who
desires to claim an exemption is much greater even if these medical
benefits are excluded. The disregarding of private medical insur-
ance benefits and Medicare benefits therefore does not create an
opportunity for possible "bargain purchases" of dependents.
An established economic relationship between a taxpayer and
the recipient justifies the taxpayer's expectation of receiving any
concomitant tax benefits. Thus, in determining the tax treat-
ment of these benefits the element of predictability must be maxi-
85 See notes 36-40 supra & accompanying text.
8 6 See note 40 supra.
87 See Merriam, Issues: Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, in SOCIAL
SECtmrr-THE FIRST TmTy-Fmv YFAas 63 (1970). A significant reason for the
creation of the Social Security program was that the group covered was believed to
be impoverished. See generally SocuL. SEctRTY BOARD, SOCIAL SECtTrrY IN
AMEuCA 137-54 (1937). Benefits have tended to lag behind the cost of living.
See Ball, Social Security and Private Pension Plans, 27 NAT'L TAx J. 467, 468
(1974). Congress, however, has now provided for automatic cost of living adjust-
ments. Social Security Amendments of 1972 § 215(i)(2)(a), 42 U.S.C. § 415(i)
(Supp. V 1975).
88 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
8 9 An illustration of this "bargain purchase" is that, assuming the taxpayer is
in a 30% tax bracket, he will be able to purchase a $225 reduction (30% of $750)
in his tax liability for as little as $1.
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mized,90 regardless of the ultimate decision. If a taxpayer's desire
to provide support for a recipient of OASDI, AFDC, or similar
benefit payments is tax-motivated, he will then recognize the need
to establish his support payments at a level sufficiently high to
qualify for the dependency exemption. If such benefits are not
included in the support computation, the taxpayer need only pro-
vide an amount greater than the total of other support provided
to the beneficiary and attYibutable to someone other than the tax-
payer. Even if OASDI, AFDC, and other such benefits are counted
as support, the taxpayer is still able to engage in tax planning be-
cause these benefit payments to the recipient can be ascertained in
advance without any risk of unexpected fluctuations. As a result,
the taxpayer will be required to provide a consistent level of sup-
port to obtain the dependency exemption if such benefits are
counted as support; establishing whether the benefits are includable
does give a taxpayer the necessary predictability to plan his eco-
nomic relationships.
But this aspect of predictability is absent with respect to both
private health insurance benefits and Medicare benefits. Because
the receipt of these benefits is contingent upon unforeseeable cir-
cumstances, a tax policy of inclusion would not foster predictability.
Without explicitly recognizing that predictability could not be
achieved if these benefits were included, the Commissioner makes
an exception for benefits paid under private health insurance plans 91
and Part B Medicare benefits 92 by disregarding these benefits for
purposes of support. The relevant decisions 93 advance no substan-
tial reason for disregarding these benefits.
9 4
The Turecamo court, however, tries to rationalize the Com-
missioner's exclusion of certain benefits on the ground that if
90 In the absence of this predictability, a taxpayer may be discouraged from
furnishing assistance to needy relatives. He may not be willing to expend sums
for a relative's support if the tax benefit of the exemption is contingent upon such
factors as that relative remaining in good health. Tax policy should not create
such disincentives that are detrimental to the elderly.
0' In determining total support, the premium payments are included and are
attributable to the policyholder as opposed to the beneficiary. Rev. Rul. 64-223,
1964-2 C.B. 50.
92 See note 12 supra.
93 See Mawhinney v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 443 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 355 F.2d
462 (3d Cir. 1966); Rev. Rul. 64-223, 1964-2 C.B. 50.
94 At one point, the Commissioner expressed a concern for a double counting
problem; if both the premiums and the benefits were included in support, the
support would be ultimately counted twice. Rev. Rul. 64-223, 1964-2 C.B. 50, at
51. Although this concern indicates that including both premiums and benefits in
total support would be unfair to the taxpayer, it provides no assistance in answering
the question as to which should be disregarded and which should be included.
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included, their unpredictability would distort economic realities.95
Conversely, because of the regular nature of premium payments, a
planned relationship is able to budget these payments as the "sup-
port" cost for medical expenses.9 6 Thus, by disregarding these
medical benefits in a support computation, any uncertainty in tax
planning for dependents is avoided because the availability of the
exemption does not depend on such unpredictable elements as the
status of one's health. The Commissioner's refusal to extend this
analysis to Part A benefits may have been influenced by the diffi-
culties involved in calculating the appropriate "premiums" to be
allocated if the coverage has been pre-paid while the beneficiary
was working; 97 the Turecamo court, however, implicitly decided
that these difficulties were insufficient to justify the significant de-
crease in predictability engendered by including Part A benefits
in a support calculation.9 8
A final consideration in determining whether government
benefits should be included in a support computation is the desire
to accord similar tax treatment to taxpayers in similar situations.
Most of the elements of the support calculation, such as food,
clothing, and shelter, which are subject to certain minimum re-
quirements, are within the control of the beneficiary and taxpayer.
As a result, taxpayers who supply the same amount of support to
people with similar needs will be entitled to identical treatment in
the dependency exemption support test whether OASDI, AFDC,
and other similar benefits used for support are included in the
computation. In contrast, the amount needed to pay medical ex-
penses in any particular year will fluctuate depending upon the
95 554 F.2d at 576.
96Id.
97 See note 81 supra.
98 This significant decrease in predictability may be illustrated by analyzing
the practical effect of including such benefits in a support computation. Let us
assume that a husband and wife decide to support the wife's mother. Assume
further that the mother has no income of her own and is receiving no social security
payments. The husband and wife supply the relative with such items as food,
shelter, clothing, and entertainment. In order to cover her medical expenses they
subscribe to Blue Cross/Blue Shield, naming the mother as beneficiary. The total
cost to the taxpayers is $3500, and this figure is the mother's total support. If this
computation can all be forecast ahead of time, the couple could rationally expect
to claim an additional personal exemption on their federal income tax return.
Assume, however, that during the tax year the mother becomes severely ill and
requires hospitalization and substantial medical care. If the difference between the
amount of medical expenses covered by the insurance and the uncovered costs that
the couple will have to pay is greater than $3500, the couple will lose their
dependency exemption, even though they intended to support the elderly woman.
This result frustrates the taxpayer's expectations although no real change has
occurred in their financial relationship with the mother.
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unpredictable occurrence of illness. Thus two taxpayers in other-
wise identical situations who treat a dependent relative in the same
manner may be treated differently for tax purposes because of hap-
penings beyond their control if benefits received to pay for the
extraordinary medical expenses of these relatives are included in
the support computation.99 Because it is unfair to treat these two
taxpayers differently, the tax system can equalize their positions,
even if a dependent relative is confronted with a serious illness, by
disregarding benefits paid by Medicare or a private health insurance
company.
B. Test for Disregarding Benefits
Having discussed the relevant policy considerations for the
treatment of benefits in a support computation, the next step is to
identify the essential elements associated with those programs that
provide excludable benefits. The two major common character-
istics of these programs that are relevant to each of the three policy
considerations are that payments are made only upon the incur-
rence of detailed specified expenses, and that the incidence of the
expenses is randomly distributed among those who have met the
general qualifications for participation in the program. The ran-
dom distribution of specified contingencies affects each individual
differently without predictability or justification. The two char-
acteristics taken together indicate that the disregarded benefits re-
flect abnormal or disproportionate expenditures. In addition, the
problem of bargain dependents would not arise by disregarding
the benefits-under programs that cover specified expenses if the in-
currence of these expenses are randomly distributed across the
population.
The following general test can be used in order to determine
whether benefits paid under a private or public benefit program are
to be included or disregarded for purposes of the total support
computation. Any benefit payments used for items normally con-
sidered support 00 are initially presumed to be included in a total
support computation. A small group of these presumed support
items are correctly disregarded, however, if the program under which
the benefits are paid has the following two characteristics:
99 For example, if Mrs. Kavanaugh had not become'ill, the Turecamos would
have qualified for a tax exemption. If, however, she did suffer the illness, and
furthermore, if Part A benefits were to be treated as included in the support com-
putation, the taxpayers would have lost the exemption even though they treated her
in exactly the same manner.
100 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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1. Payments are made upon the incurrence of specific expenses;
and
2. The incidence of these expenses is randomly distributed
among those who have met the general qualifications for partici-
pation in the program.
IV. APPLYING THE TEST
A. Past Rulings
The application of this test to benefit programs that have
already been considered by the Commissioner or a court confirms
the validity of these prior determinations. For example, old age
and survivors benefits paid under the OASDI program are cash
payments made directly to the individual participant or his sur-
vivors. The recipient is essentially free to spend the cash in any
manner he pleases. The general, unconditional nature of these
payments resolves the inclusion issue; 101 because old age and sur-
vivors benefits fail to comply with the first characteristic, they do
not qualify for exclusion under the test. Thus, prior relevant de-
cisions properly found that benefits paid under the old age and
survivors provisions of OASDI are includable in total support
computations.10
2
Other decisions have similarly determined that the payments
made under the disability provisions of the OASDI program should
be included in any total support calculation.103 Although benefit
payments are made when the contingency of disability occurs, these
payments are not made because certain specific expenses are in-
curred. Rather, the payments are provided to cover everyday ex-
penses without qualification. Once again, the dual characteristic
101 The use of the term "general nature" indicates that the benefits are applied
towards the recipients' general welfare. The payments are not in response to any
specific need of the recipient. The application of this general-specific distinction
may not always be easy. For instance, if an AFDC program divides its benefits
between general payments and rent, the latter being paid directly by the state to
the landlord, then the rent payment on behalf of the recipient is considered to be
specific in nature. Rent, however, is not an expense item that is randomly dis-
tributed and, therefore, would be included in the support computation. Rent
typically constitutes a significant portion of an individual's total support. If this
benefit were disregarded, then the possibility of "bargain" dependents would in-
crease. This policy consideration comports with the result obtained by applying
the dual characteristic test.
-02 E.g., Black v. Comm'r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 616 (1972); Rev. Rul. 58-419,
1958-2 C.B. 57; Rev. Rul. 57-344, 1957-2 C.B. 112.
103 E.g., Kincheloe v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 154 (1971); Rev. Rul.
74-543, 1974-2 C.B. 39.
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test for exclusion is not satisfied because the first characteristic is
not present.
The major case concerning treatment of AFDC benefits for
purposes of the dependency exemption support test is Lutter v.
Commissioner.1°  Mrs. Lutter received cash payments under this
program for the support of her children. Although she was re-
quired to use the payments for the benefit and support of her
children, the payments were not given to her for purposes of
covering any specific expenses. 10 5 These payments were intended
for general expenses, including food, clothing, lodging, and other
expenses whose incidence is not randomly distributed among the
participants in the AFDC program; all AFDC recipients are ex-
pected to incur similar expenses for those items.
Consequently, the failure to meet the dual characteristic test
indicates that the benefits granted under the AFDC statutes be
included in total support.
Private health insurance plans are designed so that payments
are made only if specified expenses set forth in the policy are in-
curred. Expenses for medical care are randomly distributed across
the participants under the health insurance program. In fact, this
unpredictability of an individual's medical expenses has prompted
the widespread use of the insurance concept to fund health care
costs. 0 6 Because both characteristics are present in the usual private
health insurance program-incurring specified expenses and random
distribution of their incidence-the Commissioner's ruling that
private health insurance benefits should be disregarded in a support
computation is consistent with the test result. 0 7
Similarly certain specific expenses must be incurred by re-
cipient of Medicare benefits under either Part A or B in order to
receive such benefits. 08  Like private health insurance, the type
of expenses involved-medical expenses-are randomly distributed
across the population among those persons, in this case the elderly,
who qualify for participation in either part of the program. The
existence of these two characteristics classifies Medicare benefits as
an exception to the general rule of inclusion and compels the dis-
10461 T.C. 685 (1974), af'd per curiam, 514 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975).
105 Id. 689.
1 0 6 See generally F. ANGELL, HEALTH INsmuCE 3-4 (1963); B. BuaSDFN &
J. HUTcmNsoN, HEALTH INsuRANCE: GRouP COVERAGE IN INnus'rY 1.4 (1956).
107 See note 13 supra.
108 See Social Security Amendments of 1965 §§ 1812, 1832, 1862, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395d, 1395k, 1395y (1970).
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regarding of these benefits for purposes of the dependency exemp-
tion support test. This treatment accords with the result reached
in Turecamo.
B. Future Applicability of the Test
The treatment of benefits received under other existing govern-
ment programs has not yet been resolved. Furthermore, National
Health Insurance is being considered as a new addition to the list
of governmentally sponsored benefit programs. Therefore the ques-
tion remains whether the test proposed in this Comment will reach
the correct result when it is applied to other benefit programs. The
test can achieve reasonable results that are consistent with relevant
policy considerations.
1. Existing Programs
The food stamp program permits needy individuals to purchase
food at reduced prices by selling them coupons with a food purchase
value at a cost below the face amount of the coupon.10 The dis-
count is directly correlated to need. 10 If need is sufficiently great,
the food stamp coupons can be obtained at no cost. Under the test,
food stamps are provided to cover the cost of specific expenses be-
cause they can only be used to purchase certain types of food."'
But food is a necessary expense for all that is not randomly dis-
tributed across the population receiving the stamps. This non-
compliance with the second part of the test dictates that these ben-
efit payments should be included in total support.
This result comports with relevant policy considerations. The
amount of basic food needs that food stamps are designed to meet
do not vary greatly among different individuals. Because food costs
are relatively predictable, the taxpayer may still effectively predict
his ability to claim a dependendy deduction even if these costs are
included in total support. Furthermore, the universal need for a
minimal level of food necessities eliminates any equity problems
relating to similarly situated taxpayers in the event that the benefits
are included in the support computation. Food costs, however,
may constitute as much as thirty-four percent of the total support
109 See 7 U.S.C. § 2013 (1970).
13o See Food Stamp Program-Participation of Eligible Households, 7 C.F.R.
§ 271, App. A-F (1977).
1"1 See Food Stamp Program, 7 C.F.R. §§ 270.2(s), 271.9 (1977).
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of those situated in the lower income strata." 2 This relatively high
proportion of total support therefore increases the likelihood of the
problem of "bargain purchases" of dependents if these benefits are
disregarded." 3
Medicaid is the medical assistance program designed to assist
the needy regardless of their age." 4  The program covers certain
specific medical expenses." 5 Payments made under the program are
applied solely against these covered expenses. As previously
noted,"8 medical costs are randomly distributed among groups
covered under private health insurance and Medicare. Benefits
under the Medicaid program thereby satisfy both characteristics
of the test. Medicaid benefits should thus be disregarded for pur-
poses of the dependency exemption support test."7 The conclusion
permits the same sort of predictability and equity in support cal-
culations that characterize the treatment of Medicare benefits and
private health insurance proceeds. Additionally, it will not promote
the possibility of "bargain purchases" of dependency exemptions,
thus adhering to relevant policy considerations.
2. National Health Insurance
Congress has been considering the establishment of a com-
prehensive national health insurance program for many years. Be-
cause of the relative success of Medicare and the support of the
American Medical Association for Medicare, the National Health
112 U.S. BunRAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BuLL. No. 15705,
TmuE STAiADS OF LIVING FOR AN UnnAN FA.-Nv OF FOUR PERSONS: SPRING
1967, 8 (1969).
113 If food stamp benefits are disregarded, then a taxpayer could conceivably
"purchase" a dependent by contributing as little as 33% plus $1 of the recipients
support, assuming food costs constitute 34% of the recipients total support. This
figure represents the amount of the recipient's total support not provided via the
food stamp program-66---of which the taxpayer must contribute over 50%.
114 Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 1901, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975). The Medicaid program is administered by the states much like
the AFDC program.
115 See Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 19 05(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d)
(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
116 See text accompanying note 106 supra.
"17 It might be argued, considering the treatment of AFDC benefits, that
Medicaid benefits should be included in total support and attributed to the state.
The state, however, rather than supplying the cost of medical services for those
who need the services, is supplying the cost of medical insurance to all those
eligible to participate in the Medicaid program. In relation to the rest of that
individual's support, the cost of medical insurance coverage is small. Consequently,
to ignore the effect of the program entirely does not significantly distort economic
reality, does not substantially increase the chance of people being unjustly enriched
by obtaining "bargain" dependents, and is much easier administratively than
attempting to impute the value of the medical coverage provided as support for
each qualifying individual.
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Insurance proposal has become an important current issue." 8  Since
the beginning of its session, the 95th Congress has already been pre-
sented with over a dozen bills concerning National Health Insur-
ance." 9 Examination of some of the major proposals will demon-
strate that the test suggested by this Comment will achieve results
in this area that accord with our notions of fairness and practicality.
There are three major types of National Health Insurance
proposals 120 that rely upon varying degrees of government involve-
ment. The first type would be heavily government oriented; the
government would become totally involved in health care opera-
tions, controlling access and quality of health care as well as over-
seeing the financial aspects of health care as well as overseeing the
financial aspects of health care delivery.' 2' The second type of pro-
gram, which has been labeled "middle of the road," is not as
comprehensive as the first type of program.122 Finally, many argue
for other types of programs in which the government plays only a
limited role.'
23
In all these programs, payments would be made to recipients
only if expenses that are specifically enumerated in the statute or
private policy are incurred. Payments will be applied solely against
these expenses. The programs involve medical costs on a much
larger scale than the current Medicare and Medicaid programs;
such expenses are randomly distributed across the population. All
of these National Health Insurance proposals have characteristics
that satisfy both prongs of the dual test. Benefits received under a
National Health Insurance program should therefore be excluded
from a total support computation.
Such a conclusion would produce several positive results. Tax
planning for dependents will be facilitated because predictability
is enhanced. Such treatment would serve to avoid a disparate effect
on taxpayers whose relatives incur large medical expenditures. Fur-
'I8 See Cantor, National Health Insurance, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 642 (1975).
"1
9 See [1977] 1 CoNe. INDEX (CCH) 3056 (1977).
120 Cantor, supra note 118, at 643.
121 Id. 643-44. The major bill of this type was proposed by Senator Edward
Kennedy. S. 3, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REc. S. 158 (1977). The general
characteristics of this and similar bills include the elimination of private-sector
financing, provision of unlimited coverage, and financing through an increase in
Social Security taxes supplemented by funds from general revenues.
122 Cantor, supra note 118, at 643. Only catastrophic health costs are covered;
the private sector continues to handle the lower cost basic health coverage. Once
again, financing would be handled through the Social Security system and its payroll
tax mechanism.
123 A variety of current proposals seek to maintain the private systems and
involve government only in these areas where supplementation is needed. Id.
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thermore, like other programs whose benefits have been found to
qualify for exclusion, the risk of unjust enrichment of a taxpayer
through "bargain purchases" of dependents is not greatly increased
by disregarding the benefits received under any of these proposed
National Health Insurance programs.
V. CONCLUSION
In Turecamo the Second Circuit adequately substantiated its
conclusion that benefits received under the Part A Medicare pro-
gram should be disregarded for purposes of the dependency ex-
emption support test. Like other cases and rulings dealing with
other government benefit programs in this context, however, the
Turecamo opinion became too enmeshed with the idiosyncrasies
of the particular benefits at issue without evaluating them in light
of general considerations. As a result, this opinion provides little
assistance to an area that already suffers from an acute lack of cases
and rulings with helpful precedential value.
Careful analysis of the intended purposes of the dependency
sections of the Internal Revenue Code in relation to the various
government benefit programs reveal several relevant policy con-
siderations. These policy considerations have facilitated the de-
velopment of a simple dual characteristic test to be used in deter-
mining whether particular benefits should be excluded from a total
support computation. The recognition of these policy concerns
and the relevant characteristics of the various programs involved is
imperative to insure the proper future classification of benefits still
to be presented to the courts and the Commissioner in the context
of a dependency exemption support test computation.
1971
